Towards a model resolution tracking mechanism for parliament and provincial legislatures

By: Kgabo Masehela and Isaac Nkuna, Limpopo Legislature

Background

The Republic of South Africa is a democratic state as stated in the Constitution of South Africa of 1996; it therefore has an obligation to ensure the maximum realization of the values of accountability, transparency, effective oversight agencies and institutions, agencies that are accountable to the public. In terms of the Constitution, parliament and legislatures as one arm of government at the provincial spheres play a crucial role in ensuring amongst others:

• Conduct oversight S 114(2)(b)/133(2)5 and-the-PPMA;

• Hold the executive accountable -S 114 (2)(a); and
• Protect and ensure maximum realization of the values of transparency, accountability, and open democratic process with respect to parliament itself

The above constitutional provisions empower the Parliament and Legislature to provide ‘mechanisms’ to maintain ‘oversight’ of any organ of state and Legislatures have responded to this key mandate by establishing portfolio and standing committees to play an oversight function over the executives.
This paper reviews the extent to which resolutions are implemented by the executive. Data shows that there gaps in the implementation of committee resolutions and therefore proposes a resolution tracking tool. The paper is located within the Limpopo Legislature’s Standing committee of Public Accounts (SCOPA) for the Financial Year 2006/07. We firstly analyze the level of implementation of resolutions and secondly, we propose a comprehensive guide for resolution tracking mechanism. The proposed model should be read within the broader framework of deepening democracy, oversight, accountability, evaluation of committee work, knowledge construction and bringing efficiency in the Legislative sector.

The concept of oversight

One of the most important roles of parliament is to exercise oversight over the executive (Murray and Nijzink 2002). Oversight means supervision, watchful care, management or control. It suggests a watchdog function over ongoing activities of an agency. This is in line with the assertion by (Scruton 1996) which defines oversight as "action or an act of overseeing something; supervision, inspection; charge, care, control."

According to Corder et al (1999) there is a tendency to view oversight in a limited way which it is seen as the role of the opposition ‘designed to police and expose maladministration and corruption’. Senay and Besdziek (1999) defines ”Oversight as a proactive interaction initiated by a legislature with the executive and administrative organs … that encourages compliance with the constitutional obligation on the executive and administration to account to the public’s elected representatives, and which advances the ideals of good government, development and cooperative governance’. This further entails: 'review, monitoring and supervision of the executive and other organs of state, programmes, activities and policy implementation.

Literature Review

Constitutional institutions such as Parliament are in their 15year in South Africa and as a result are still putting new systems and programmes in place. This include amongst others; resolution tracking mechanism by Committees - a system that should ensure that committee resolutions are implemented by the executive.

The current practice of resolution tracking is varied, complex and has limitations. Firstly, after committees pass resolution/s, and a copy of the resolutions is sent to the Department for implementation. Progress as to how far the implementation takes place with Departments concerned is largely left for implementation by the department. An oversight model (SALSA, 2007) with regard to tracking of committee resolutions proposes the following procedure.

• Tabling of Committee reports in the House

• Submission of House resolutions to Office of the Premier for referral to relevant executive department
• Resolutions & recommendations may also be referred directly to relevant executive departments
• Cabinet processes (ideal)

The above SALSA report (2007) falls short of outlining a detailed model on how resolutions should be implemented. Griffith (2005) argues that in order for the Committee deliberations and recommendations contained in Oversight Reports to be taken forward and make an impact as far as government performance is concerned, resolution tracking and evaluation (in terms of compliance) is required.

KwaZulu-Natal Legislature has developed a resolution tracker form which simply records committee resolution but doesn’t show whether the executive implemented the recommendation. It is not a mechanism to track but is an administrative tool for compliance.

Public Service Accountability Monitor (PSAM) developed a similar tracking mechanism for expenditure by comparing budget and programme objectives with quarterly financial reports. PSAM continuously tracks how government service delivery departments spend the money allocated to them. PSAM also tracks compliance with public finance regulations and legislated financial reporting requirements (including those governing the production of annual reports, audit reports and financial reports). Its emerging monitoring methodology consisted of undertaking a comparison between corrective steps taken and the regulatory provisions governing the discipline, ethics and accountability of public servants in post-apartheid South Africa. PSAM’s tracking tool focuses on monitoring expenditure and this paper argues that majority of Committee Resolutions are not just confined to financial accountability.

The above tools fall short of outlining a comprehensive mechanism that ensures resolutions which are pursue developmental priorities are implemented.

Methodology

Interviews and documentary analysis were the two main data gathering techniques. Documentary data was found a very important source of information. The main source included SCOPA documents on resolution implementation of all provincial departments for the FY 2006/07. Interviews were conducted with committee secretaries of Committees in the Limpopo Legislature. A method of unstructured interviews was utilized as means of validating whether there are existing models for resolution tracking. This tool proved to be most useful in extracting personal experiences from secretaries who had worked in the Legislature for more than 5 years each.
The data was converted into quantitative format for each of the 12 departments (Education, Health and Social Development, Sports, Arts and Culture, Economic Development and Tourism, Agriculture, Roads and Transport, Safety and Security, Local Government and Housing, Public Works, Treasury, Office of the Premier and Legislature ) and was analyzed to get a ‘get a sense of the whole’.

Findings

The state of resolution implementation

The legislature passes a number of resolutions every financial year which the executive is expected to implement. In this section attempt will be made to assess the level of implementation of resolutions and the implications thereof, especially with regard to resolution tracking by the relevant sections in the Legislature.

Figure 1 below indicates the distribution of resolutions passed by the Legislature across Departments in the year under review. The percentage of resolutions passed is a proxy of challenges and problems that a particular Department was faced with during the year under review. For instance, it is clear that out of the total of 164 resolutions passed by the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA), the Department of Health had most of the resolutions compared to all Departments at 20% (33). The above number reaches 49 (30%) when the social development section (16 [10%]) of the Department is taken into consideration. This is by comparison a very high number, especially given the fact that the passing of resolutions is indicative of problems and challenges facing the Department at a particular period.

As illustrated in Figure 1, another Department that had more challenges and problems in the year under review was the Department of Transport which had 18% (29) of the resolutions passed by the Legislature. Also worth noting with regard to the implementation of resolutions, there were 7 resolutions (Department of Transport and Office of the Premier) that were to be implemented by agencies (AG, Treasury) other than the affected Department itself. The successfully implementation of these types of resolutions need the commitment of both the Department and agency.

Figure 1:

As can be seen in Figure 2 below, most Departments struggled to implement SCOPA resolutions. For instance, out of the total of 164 resolutions passed for the year under review, only 38 (23%) were fully implemented. This is a small number given the number of resolutions passed. If resolutions are not fully implemented it means that the weaknesses in Departmental operations will not be corrected and hence problems are likely to recur. A general overview of Figure 2 shows that almost all of the Departments are lacking when it comes to the implementation of SCOPA resolutions with the average implementation rate at 0.3.

Figure 2:

Partially implemented resolutions consist of resolutions which have not been implemented in full as per Legislature recommendation. What it means is that certain aspects of the resolutions have not been addressed thus leaving outstanding issues which are likely to recur if not dealt with in full. The total number of partially implemented resolutions in the year under review were 44. This constitutes 27% of the total number of resolutions passed during the year under review. Figure 3 shows the distribution of partially implemented resolutions per Department. Worth noting is that it is important for resolutions to implemented in full as per recommendation by the Legislature. It is worrying to note that the number of partially implemented resolutions was at a significant percentage of 27%. It is crucial that this number should decrease in the future.

Figure 3:

As figure 4 illustrates Departments had resolutions that were not properly implemented in the year under review. The Department where this problem was most prevalent was the Department of Transport (13). These types of resolutions occur as a result of failure or negligence from Departments to implement the resolutions as per requirement. What emerged from the public hearings with Departments was that the reason why most of the resolutions were not properly implemented was the attempt by some Department to challenge the resolution or the findings of the Auditor-General. It is of concern to note that these type of resolutions made a significant chunk at 32 (20%).What makes this act to be unacceptable is that Departments often have time during and after the hearings to make follow ups on matters that affect them. In fact, clarity can be sought during the hearing is to what is expected from a Department or why a Department is not agreeing with the findings of the Auditor- General.

Figure 4:

Another problematic area that emerged during the hearings was the tendency by some Departments not to respond to resolutions. Often a Department is given the opportunity to submit its responses in writing. It is at this stage that it becomes clear that some resolutions have not been responded to. Figure 5 illustrates the total number of resolutions per Department and the prevalent or non-prevalence of the act of not responding to resolutions. It is clear from Figure 5 that not all Departments had this problem except for three Departments (the Departments of Public Works, Transport and Treasury). It is encouraging to note that the number of ‘not responded to’ resolutions was 4 (2%). Worth noting is that notwithstanding the minimal number of these type of resolutions, it is crucial that this problem must be avoided in the future as it makes the work of the Committee difficult and raises questions on the commitment of the Department concerned to address problems and challenges facing it.

Figure 5:

Resolutions that were to be implemented by an agent outside the Department were 12 (7%) in the year under review (Figure 6). The outside agent in most instances was the Office of the Auditor- General. For instance, the Committee may recommend that the AG follow up on the certain matters. The implementation of these types of resolutions involves both the Department and the agent (i.e. the Auditor General, SASSA). Each one of them has a role to play: the Department must cooperate with the Office of the AG while the AG has the duty to conduct his or her job as effectively as possible. The challenge with this type of resolutions is that if not monitored are likely to fall within the cracks.

Figure 6:

Another critical factor in resolution implementation is the tendency by some Departments not to implement resolutions passed by the Legislature. As illustrated in Figure 7, this anomaly was prevalent in three Departments [the Departments of Health (12), Office of the Premier (10), Social Development (9) and the Legislature (8)]. This is a disturbing phenomenon that needs to be dealt with.

Figure 7:

An overall examination of resolution implementation in the year under review shows that there are serious gaps which need to be closed. As can be seen in Figure 8, it is of concern to note that only 23% of the resolutions passed by the Legislature were fully implemented. This means that 77% of the resolutions were implemented, partially implemented or not responded to. The above scenario shows that there are serious gaps with regard to resolution implementation within Departments.

Figure 8:

Reasons for failure to implement resolutions by Departments

Data indicates that departments have somewhat failed to implement the majority and important resolutions which renders the parliamentary oversight ineffective. Reasons for the failure to implement resolutions by Departments are as follows:

• Challenging the findings of the AG.

• Not taking disciplinary action as proposed or applying a standard procedure to disciplinary matters which are completely different.
• Failure to recover money from responsible officials or agencies.
• Tendency to institute lengthy and unfocussed investigations.
• Lacking a sense of urgency even when dealing with resolutions with specific timeframes.

Concluding summary

Seeing that there are serious gaps in resolution implementation as indicated by the data provided, it is therefore important to ensure that an effective mechanism is put in place to track and monitor all resolutions that are passed by the Legislature or Parliament. The proposed model should not only add to knowledge production but should play a critical role in addressing matters pertaining to oversight and accountability to enhance service delivery. The model could inter alia be inclusive of the following aspects/elements:

• It should have an electronic resolution tracking device for effective, timeously and continuous tracking of resolutions. The device must be managed by the administrative staff of the legislature or parliament who handle all reports and submissions by government Departments.

• The model should clearly outline by when, by whom and how resolutions should be implemented.
• There should be a clear direction about the disciplinary measures that should be taken against negligent officials as per PFMA.
• The relevant committees of Parliament should note all resolutions that apply to them in their minutes and constantly check on them.
• There should be continuous hearings and report back by Departments to check/assess the progress made.
• A joint venture and collaboration among committees is essential for effective implementation of resolutions.
• There should be a buy-in from the executive to ensure that resolutions are effectively implemented.

It should be noted that although the decision to pass resolutions is a political process done by members of the legislature, however, the follow up with regard to the implementation involved checking and assessing progress reports (which is mainly an administrative exercise). It is at this level that effective knowledge management is needed. As part of the information society, effective knowledge management in this case should entail: using the right tools, devices or software to enhance resolution tracking as suggested above. Given the number and size of provincial Departments that committees deal with, it is possible that the information submitted could be overwhelming and complex to deal with. Complicating the situation is the fact that Departments submit their information in the form of hard copies. Scanning through the documents remains a challenge which could even be more frustrating if the data is not properly organized or converted into a user friendly format.

Finally by effectively managing knowledge emanating from resolutions, decisions and programmes, parliamentary committees will contribute to oversight, accountability, development and service delivery. In order to effectively exercise their oversight roles, parliamentary committees need knowledge which must be properly channeled and handled in order to achieve the intended results.

References

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2. Corder et al (1999) Report on Parliamentary Oversight and Accountability. Prepared by Parliament UCT.
3. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act no 108 of 1996.
4. Griffith,G (2005) Parliament and Accountability in the 21st Century: The Role of Parliamentary Oversight Committees, ASPG Conference, Sydney 6-8 October 2005.
5. Murray, C and Nijzink, L (2002) Building representative democracy South African Legislatures and the Constitution. Cape Town, Parliamentary Support Programme.
6. Public Service Accountability Monitor oldwww.ru.ac.za/community/PSAM
7. Senay, C and Besdziek, D (1999) Enhancing Oversight – The role of Provincial Standing Committees in an Open, Transparent and Accountable Democracy. Unpublished report
8. Secretaries Association Legislatures of South African (2007). Oversight Model, Unpublished report.
9. Scruton, R. 1996. A Dictionary of political thought. Macmillan: London